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LESSEES OF DEFECTIVE VEHICLE

(from page 83)

treated certain lease transactions as subject to
part 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code
when certain elements of a sale are present. In
deciding whether a transaction issubject to part
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, courts from
other jurisdictions found the following factors
relevant: whether the sum of the rental payments will amortize the value, with interest, of
the goods being rented; whether the term of the
lease covers the useful life of the goods; whether
there is an option to purchase the goods at the
end of the lease for a nominal price; whether
the lessee is responsible for damage or loss,
insurance coverage, repairs, and replacement of
parts; and whether the lessee isrequired to pay a
license fee, security deposit, or taxes.
The court examined the "Retail Buyer's Order"
together with the agreement and concluded
that the transaction between the Sellers and
Frank Griffin possessed elements characteristic
of both a sale and a lease. Like a sale, the sum of
the Sellers' rental payments would amortize
most of the Jeep's value, virtually matching the
purchase price noted in the Retail Buyer's Order.
In addition, the Sellers had paid all expenses
related to vehicle ownership as if they had
bought the vehicle outright. On the other hand,
like a lease, the agreement contained no option
for purchase, although the Sellers argued that

TRUTH-IN-ADVERTISING LAW
PROHIBITS ANTI-ABORTION
GROUP FROM ADVERTISING AS
ABORTION INFORMATION
SERVICE
In Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North
Texas, Inc. v. State of Texas, 749 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.
109 S.Ct.
Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S.
2431 (1989), the Texas Court of Appeals held that
an anti-abortion organization violated the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act ("the Act"), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§
17.41-17.826 (Vernon 1987), by advertising as an
abortion information service and then subjecting its unwitting clients to graphic depictions of
abortion procedures. The court held that even
though the clinic did not actually sell medical
services, it engaged in trade or commerce as
defined by the Act.
-,

the parties previously had agreed to an option
for purchase at the end of the lease period.
Ultimately, the court relied upon the clear,
unambiguous language of the agreement which
expressly stated and restated that the agreement
was one of lease rather than sale. The court held
that there had been no transfer of title and thus
no "sale;" therefore, the agreement was not
covered by § 672.608.
Next, the court addressed the Sellers' claim
under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The court recognized that the Act was intended to provide
broad protection to consumers, but noted that
§ 2301 of the Act expressly limits its application
to a recognized sale and purchase transaction
between a "supplier" and "a buyer.. .of any
consumer product." 526 So. 2d at 156. The court
reasoned that the Act therefore applies only to a
sale of goods, or to a lease of goods that is substantially connected to a sale or purchase of
goods. As the court had already determined, the
transaction between Frank Griffin and the Sellers
was a pure lease transaction. Extending the Act
to pure lease transactions, cautioned the court,
isan activity better left to the legislature. Accordingly, the court held that the warranty provisions
of the Magnuson-Moss Act did not apply to the
agreement.
Elizabeth A. Mitchell

Background
From 1984 through 1986, Mother & Unborn
Baby Care of North Texas, Inc., ("the Center")
placed advertisements for free pregnancy testing under "Abortion Information & Services"
and "Clinics-Medical" in the Yellow Pages of
the telephone directory. The organization operated under other names, including the Problem
Pregnancy Center and Abortion Action Affiliates Problem Pregnancy Center. A large number of women telephoned the Center requesting abortions. By giving evasive answers to
requests for information, the Center misled the
women into believing that it was an abortion
clinic. Consequently, many of the women scheduled appointments.
After arriving at the Center, a woman typically
gave the staff personal medical information and
submitted a urine sample for a free pregnancy

test. Because the women were informed that the
test results would be ready in only thirty minutes, they frequently chose to wait. During this
time, the women were led to a separate room
where Center counselors showed them graphic
video and slide presentations depicting abortion procedures. Generally, it was only after one
of these presentations that the women began to
realize that the Center was not an abortion
clinic. After the presentations, counselors urged
the women not to have abortions. Many of the
women became angry or emotionally distressed.
During the weeks following the appointments,
the Center followed up with notes and phone
calls having anti-abortion themes. The telephone company eventually refused to allow the
Center to continue advertising itself as an abortion service.
Trial Court
The State of Texas brought suit against the
Center and its founder Charles J. Pelletier II. At
trial, a jury found the Center and Pelletier liable
for fraud and for false, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices. The court enjoined the Center
from engaging in its past practices, and ordered
that it fully disclose the nature of its business in
its future advertisements. In addition, the court
assessed civil penalties against the defendants
and awarded attorneys' fees to the State. The
Center and Pelletier appealed.
Appellate Court
On appeal, the Center raised several points of
error. First, the Center claimed that because its
conduct did not constitute trade or commerce,
the Act was inapplicable to its activities. Section
17.46 of the Act provides that "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are... unlawful..."
Section 17.45 of the Act defines the terms
"trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising,
offering for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of
any good or service..." The court noted that not
only had the Center advertised in the telephone
directory, but that it had also distributed pamphlets and provided services, including pregnancy testing and anti-abortion counseling. The
court determined that these actions constituted
"trade" and "commerce" for the purposes of
the Act.

Second, the Center contended that the Act
was inapplicable because the Center did not sell
its goods and services. The court stated that it
was immaterial for purposes of the Act whether
the Center provided a service in exchange for
money. "Sale" is but one of five transaction
types enumerated in the Act. The court found
that the Center's clients were "consumers" as
defined by the Act because they had sought to
purchase services from the Center. The court
concluded that the Act applies when, as here,
there is an unconscionable course of conduct
which adversely affects a consumer.
Third, the Center claimed that it was exempt
from the Act because it disseminated information to the public. Section 17.49(a) of the Act
exempts certain media from coverage unless
they have knowledge of the practices declared
to be unlawful under the Act. The court noted
that the scope of the media exemption is expressly limited to those who publish advertisements for third parties, and that the exemption is
withdrawn if the advertiser learns that the material is deceptive. The court determined that the
Center was not a member of the media because
it disseminated information for itself. Further,
the Center should have been aware that its
advertisements were deceptive after the telephone company refused to renew these advertisements. Therefore, even if the Center was a
member of the media, it had forfeited any
exempted status it may have held.
As their fourth point of error, the Center argued that it was not covered by the Act because
it was a not-for-profit corporation. Section 17.47
of the Act states the Texas legislature's intention
that courts be guided by decisions under the
Federal Trade Commission Act ("the FTCA"), 15
U.S.C. §§ 45-57 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Accordingly, the Center cited two cases in which federal
courts had declined to hold either a blood bank
or the National Organization for Women liable
for deceptive practices under the FTCA. The
Texas court pointed out that the FTCA exempts
non-profit groups from its regulations, but that
the Act has no such exemption. Consequently,
the court rejected the Center's arguments.
In addition to the above points of error, the
Center raised several constitutional challenges.
(continued on page 86)
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The Center contended that because the Act's
language was vague and overbroad, it violated
both the federal and state constitutions. The
court stated that statutes are overbroad if they
"sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 749 S.W.
2d at 540, citing NAACP v.Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,
307 (1964). The Act prohibits false statements or
advertisements which harm the public. Such
practices are never constitutionally protected.
The court thus concluded that the Act was not
overbroad in that it applied only to the Center's
deceptive, unprotected speech. In addition, in
Texas, a court must examine how the statute is
applied to the accused. Here, the Act was not
applied to the Center specifically to limit its first
amendment right to advocate an anti-abortion
position, but to prohibit false statements that
could injure the public.
The Center also alleged that the Act was void
for vagueness in that it failed to give persons of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that their conduct was unlawful. Because greater leeway is
given to regulating statutes, the court placed the
burden of proof on the Center to attack the
validity of the Act. The court noted that in cases
arising under the first amendment, courts are
concerned as to whether a statute is vague "on
its face." If astatute isvague on its face, it cannot
provide fair notice because it specifies no standard of conduct. The court held that the Center
failed to show that the Act was impermissibly
vague. Not only does the Act list a number of
specific practices as violations, but it also defines
many terms used within its text. Given this level
of specificity and detail, the court held the Act to
be constitutional.
The Center's last constitutional claim was that

its free speech rights were violated. The court
held that the Center did not have an unqualified
right to distribute anti-abortion material. Freedom of speech is not immune from regulation; it
may be abridged when outweighed by a compelling state interest. The court held that the Act
is narrowly tailored to fit its purpose: to protect
the public from deliberate deception and to
provide consumers with a cause of action less
burdensome than fraud and breach of warranty.
The court found that these purposes constituted
a compelling state interest justifying the regulation of the Center's right to distribute antiabortion material. Further, even if there had
been no compelling state interest, it is not
unconstitutional to ban false and misleading
advertisements.
Finally, the court held that the trial court did
not err in assessing civil penalties against Pelletier as an individual. Although the jury had
assessed penalties against only the Center, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding that because Pelletier had taken such a
prominent role in the Center's activities he
could not hide behind the "corporate veil." The
appellate court affirmed all aspects of the trial
court's judgment.
Dissent

The dissent argued that the Act was designed
to regulate only commercial activities, not moral
conduct. Accordingly, the Act did not apply to
defendants because they were merely attempting to get their anti-abortion message to women
seeking abortions. The dissent disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that this was the type
of activity the legislature intended to prohibit.
M. E.Welsh
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